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ABSTRACT: In a series of experimental studies we tried to answer the question whether and to what extent the dif-
ferent types of fallacies that theoretically speaking are a violation of the argument scheme rule, are seen as unrea-
sonable by ordinary language users. Of each of the three main types of argument schemes (i.e. symptomatic argu-
mentation, causal argumentation and comparison argumentation) one or more misuses were investigated. In this 
paper the experimental results pertaining to the argumentum ad consequentiam, the argumentum ad populum, the 
slippery slope and the fallacy of the false analogy are discussed. 
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1. CONCEPTIONS OF REASONABLENESS 
 
In our comprehensive empirical research project ‘conceptions of reasonableness’ we attempt to 
determine to what extent the norms ordinary language users apply in judging argumentative 
moves converge with the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion. Do ordinary language 
users perceive rule violations as unreasonable or, in other words we ask what do they think of 
fallacious moves in a discussion? 
In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, argumentation is seen as part of a proce-
dure aimed at resolving a difference of opinion concerning the acceptability of a view or stand-
point. The moves made by the protagonist of the standpoint and those made by – or ascribed to – 
the real or imaginary antagonist in the discourse are regarded reasonable only if they can be con-
sidered as a contribution to the resolution of the difference of opinion. In an ideal model of a 
critical discussion the pragma-dialectical theory describes a discussion procedure that specifies 
the four stages an argumentative discussion must go through. There is a ‘confrontation’ stage, in 
which a difference of opinion manifests itself. There is also an ‘opening’ stage, in which the pro-
cedural and material points of departure for a critical discussion about the standpoints at issue are 
established. In the ‘argumentation’ stage, the standpoints are challenged and defended. And the 
critical discussion closes with a ‘concluding’ stage, in which the results of the discussion are de-
termined. In order to comply with the dialectical norms of reasonableness, in all four stages the 
speech acts performed in the discourse have to be in agreement with the rules for critical discus-
sion. If they are not, then they may be considered fallacious.  
 The different rules for critical discussion derive their ‘problem validity’ from the fact that 
they are instrumental in resolving the difference of opinion. To resolve a difference of opinion, 
however, the rules must, besides being effective, also – at least to a certain extent – be acceptable 
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to the parties involved in the difference: they should be intersubjectively approved in order to be 
‘conventionally valid.’ 
In our research project we systematically study each of the four discussion stages by ex-
amining violations of a specific discussion rule. For the confrontation stage we examined viola-
tions of the freedom rule; for the opening stage we examined violations of the burden of proof 
rule; for the concluding stage we examined violations of the closure rule. In this paper we focus a 
central rule that pertains to the argumentation stage: the argument scheme rule. The main ques-
tions are: what do ordinary language users think of violations of this rule? Do they think that 
every single violation is unreasonable? Are all violations judged the same or are some more 
strongly considered unreasonable than others? 
 
2. THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL ARGUMENT SCHEME RULE 
 
Argument schemes are principles or rules underlying arguments that legitimate the inferential 
step from a premise to a standpoint. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, p. 96) 
they characterize the way in which the acceptability of the premise that is explicit in the argu-
mentation is transferred to the standpoint (Garssen, 2001, p. 81). The argument scheme that has 
been used by an arguer determines the specific relation that is established between the explicit 
premise and the standpoint that is being justified. 
 The pragma-dialectical typology of argument schemes is designed to enable an adequate 
evaluation of the argumentation. In this typology, three types of argumentation are distinguished: 
symptomatic or ‘token’ argumentation, where there is a relation of concomitance between the 
premise and the standpoint; comparison or ‘similarity’ argumentation, where the relation is one 
of resemblance; and causal or ‘consequence’ argumentation, where there is a causal relation be-
tween the premise and the conclusion. In symptomatic argumentation, the argument is ‘presented 
as if it is an expression, a phenomenon, a sign or some other kind of symptom of what is stated in 
the standpoint’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 97). In comparison argumentation, the 
argument is ‘presented as if there were a resemblance, an agreement, a likeness, a parallel, a cor-
respondence or some other kind of similarity between that what is stated in the argument and 
what is stated in the standpoint’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 97). In causal argu-
mentation ‘the argumentation is presented as if what I stated in the argumentation is a means to, 
a way to, an instrument for or some other kind of causative factor for the standpoint’ (van Eem-
eren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 97). 
 These three argumentation types are categorized according to the way in which the argu-
ment scheme that is used is to be evaluated. For each type of argumentation there are corre-
sponding assessment criteria pertaining to the relation between the premise and the standpoint. 
The argument schemes differ from each other because each scheme comes with its own unique 
set of critical questions. 
For an adequate defense of a standpoint the (explicit) statements making up the argumen-
tation will have to be accepted by both parties. But even if that is the case, the defense cannot be 
considered successful if these statements do not adequately support the standpoint. Only if the 
protagonist uses an appropriate argument scheme for his defense and applies that scheme cor-
rectly the defense can be judged correctly. That is why the argument scheme rule is stated as fol-
lows: ‘standpoints may not be regarded as conclusively defended by argumentation that is not 
presented as based on formally conclusive reasoning if the defense does not take place by manes 
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN, BART GARSSEN AND BERT MEUFFELS 68 
of appropriate argument schemes that are applied correctly’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 
2004, p. 194). 
The argument scheme rule can be violated in two ways. First, the argument scheme that 
is used in the argumentation can be inappropriate. This means that the protagonist and the an-
tagonist cannot agree on the conditions for its use. If in such a case the protagonist persists in us-
ing this argument scheme, it is chosen incorrectly. In the end this is a matter of intersubjective 
agreement. In principle, every type of argument scheme can be disapproved of by one of the par-
ties in the discussion. However, there are some argument schemes that are inappropriate per se. 
This goes for instance for argumentation by means of which the standpoint that something is the 
case is defended by pointing to desirable or undesirable consequences. According to the pragma-
dialectical approach this is a fallacy because it is not permissible to test an assertion (descriptive 
proposition) by pointing out the undesirable effects of the assertion (evaluative proposition), then 
facts and values are confused (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 162). In other words, the 
value that one attaches to the consequences of a state of affairs has no bearing on the question 
whether that state of affairs exists or not. This kind of fallacious argumentation is traditionally 
known as the argumentum ad consequentiam. Another example of an argument scheme that is 
inappropriate per se is the argumentum ad populum in which the sheer number of people is an 
indication of the acceptability of the standpoint: because everybody thinks it is good, it must be 
good. 
A second way to violate the argument scheme rule is to use an appropriate argument 
scheme in an incorrect way. An argument scheme has been used correctly if the appropriate cor-
rectness conditions have been fulfilled. These conditions correspond to the critical questions that 
are associated with the argument scheme concerned (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 
162). For arguments from analogy, one of the critical questions is whether the comparison is jus-
tified or whether there are crucial differences between the things that are compared. If an arguer 
cannot answer any of the critical reactions in a satisfactory way, he uses the argument scheme in 
an incorrect way and violates the argument scheme rule.  
One of the critical questions pertaining to arguments from consequence is whether what 
is presented as a consequence will actually occur. If a course of action is rejected on the grounds 
of the extremely negative result that it would have and it is highly unlikely that this result would 
occur at all, the scheme is used incorrectly. A common abuse of this argument scheme, in which 
the speculation on unsubstantiated negative consequences is carried to an extreme, is known as 
slippery slope.  
The fallacies we just mentioned may seem very different from each other. But they have 
one thing in common: they are all should violations of the rule that regulates the use of argument 
schemes in the stage of a critical discussion in which the parties put forward arguments and criti-
cism in order to critically test the acceptability of a standpoint. The question is: what do ordinary 
language users think of these kinds of violations? 
 Because of practical limitations it was not possible to include all violations in this study. 
We wanted to include instantiations of all three types of argument schemes. Furthermore, we 
wanted to include instantiations of inappropriate argument schemes as well as instantiations of 
incorrect uses of argument schemes. Therefore we chose the argumentum ad consequentiam 
(causal; inappropriate choice), the argumentum ad populum (symptomatic; inappropriate choice), 
the slippery slope (causal; incorrect use) and the false analogy (comparison; incorrect use). 
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3. TEST CONSTRUCTION AND RESULTS 
 
For each of the four fallacies under investigation we constructed a pencil and paper test consist-
ing of a series of short dialogues. Each fragment contained an imaginary dialogue between two 
interlocutors in which one of them systematically violates the argument scheme rule and com-
mits an argument scheme fallacy. The presentation was in all cases as clear as possible. Since we 
were not interested in testing the respondents skills in identifying fallacies but in their opinions 
about the different rule violations, we tried to keep the variables that have to do with clarity un-
der control. 
The dialogues were constructed in accordance with a fixed pattern. All experimental dia-
logues consisted of three turns. In the first turn, the first speaker (the protagonist of the stand-
point) presents his standpoint, in the second turn the antagonist expresses doubt about the ac-
ceptability of the standpoint and in the third turn the first speaker tries to cope with that doubt by 
putting forward argumentation. 
 In each test the fallacious dialogues were contrasted with reasonable counterparts. The 
reasonable dialogues were constructed in a very similar way as the fallacious ones. In addition to 
the experimental dialogues, we included some fillers: dialogues containing tu quoque fallacies, 
direct personal attacks or the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof and dialogues that contained 
no fallacious discussion moves. The filler fragments in which no violation of the argument 
scheme rule takes place were constructed in accordance with the same fixed pattern that was 
used for the construction of the fallacious examples. Including fillers dialogues will prevent the 
respondents from finding out the actual goal of the research. It also made it possible to achieve a 
better judgment the stability of test. In previous studies, we found repeatedly that respondents 
considered the direct personal attack and shifting the burden of proof equally unreasonable, 
while tu quoque was always considered much more reasonable (Van Eemeren and Meuffels, 
2002, pp. 58-59). If these absolute and ordinal proportions are replicated, then our confidence in 
the validity of the data increases. 
 Each respondent in the experiments we carried out was exposed to between 36 and 48 
constructed discussion fragments. The respondents were asked to judge the reasonableness of the 
final turn in the dialogue. They could indicate their judgment on a 7-point scale (varying from 
1=very unreasonable to 7=very reasonable). The written instruction given to the respondents 
stated that people can have different opinions on the question of what is allowed or reasonable in 
a discussion. The notion of reasonableness was not specified any further. The respondents were 
Dutch pupils with 4 or 5 years of secondary, i.e. high school or pre-university education.  
 
The ad consequentiam test 
 
In ad consequentiam argumentation the transference of acceptability from the premise to the 
standpoint is not possible because the acceptability of a descriptive standpoint is independent of 
the values that are attached to the consequences or effects of the state of affairs that is described 
in the standpoint. The ad consequentiam moves in our study always consisted of a descriptive 
standpoint while the argumentation pointed to the positive or negative consequences of the state 
of affairs mentioned in the standpoint. The following is example of an ad consequentiam dia-
logue: 
 
A: It seems very unlikely to me that the sun will ever burn up. 
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B: How come? 
A: Well, life on earth would then be impossible wouldn't it? 
 
These fallacious discussion moves were contrasted with non-fallacious pragmatic argumentation. 
In pragmatic argumentation the standpoint is concerned with a plan or policy and the argumenta-
tion mentions positive or negative consequences of this plan or policy. These dialogues were 
formulated in such a way that they are not problematic.  
 
A: We shouldn’t ever completely computerize our education.  
B: Why not? 
A: Well, it is necessary for our students to develop social contacts and that will not happen if 
all the work is done on a computer. 
 
The results in Table 1 indicate that the respondents found the ad consequentiam fallacies highly 
unreasonable (2.64). The non-fallacious pragmatic argumentations in this test were considered 
reasonable by the respondents (5.03). 
 
Table 1: Means of reasonableness scores for the ad consequentiam study (between brackets: 
standard deviation; k = number of representations) 
 Mean sd k 
Argumentum ad consequentiam 2.64 (.82) 12 
Pragmatic argumentation (reasonable) 5.03 (.57) 12 
 
Fillers 
Non-pragmatic argumentation (reasonable) 5.27 (.60) 12 
Tu quoque 3.83 (.86) 4 
Direct personal attack 2.76 (.93) 4 
Shifting the burden of proof 2.47 (.94) 4 
(1=very unreasonable, 7=very reasonable)  
 
While the respondents made a sharp distinction between reasonable argumentation and ad con-
sequentiam argumentation
1
, a significant difference between the reasonable pragmatic argumen-
tation (5.03) and the non-pragmatic reasonable argumentation (5.27) could not be found. The 
other filler dialogues behaved as was expected. The direct personal attack and the fallacy of 
shifting the burden of proof were both seen as highly unreasonable while the tu quoque fallacy 
was considered more reasonable but not reasonable in an absolute sense (5 or higher). 
 
The ad populum test 
 
The ad populum dialogues in the second test were constructed in the form of the same three-turn 
dialogues. In the first turn the protagonist puts forward a descriptive standpoint and in the third 





 F(2,58)=47.28; p<.001; pv=.45 
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A: Amsterdam is the most criminal city in the Netherlands. 
B: How come? 
A: Well, everybody says so. 
 
These fallacious ad populum dialogues were contrasted with non-fallacious dialogues in which 
the protagonist defends his (descriptive) standpoint by referring to the results of inquiries, sur-
veys or polls. The following dialogue contains an example of such a non-fallacious discussion 
move: 
 
A: For the Dutch, France is a very popular holiday destination.  
B: How do you know? 
A: The results of a poll show that most Dutch go to France for their holidays. 
 
As Table 2 shows, there is a very noticeable difference between the judgments about the ad 
populum moves (2.77) and the (reasonable) arguments based on quantitative data (5.02). This 
difference proved to be statistically significant. Overall there is a sharp difference between the ad 




Table 2: Means of reasonableness scores for the ad populum study (between brackets: standard 
deviation; k = number of representations) 
  Mean sd k 
Argumentum ad populum  2.77 (.80) 6 
Argumentation based on quantitative data 5.02 (.78) 6 
 
Fillers 
Reasonable argumentation  5.88 (.73) 6 
Tu quoque  4.05 (.72) 6 
Direct personal attack  2.82 (.72) 6 
Shifting the burden of proof  2.84 (.83) 6 
(1=very unreasonable, 7=very reasonable) 
 
A significant difference between the reactions to argumentation based on quantitative data (5.02) 
and other reasonable argumentation (5.88) could not be found. As in the ad consequentiam test, 
the reactions to the fillers were as expected and in line with our previous studies. 
 
The slippery slope test 
 
The slippery slope fallacy entails erroneously suggesting that by taking the proposed course of 
action one’s situation will go from bad to worse. The slippery slope is an incorrect use of the 
scheme of pragmatic argumentation. In the test dialogues, the third turn consisted of warnings 
against the consequences of the condemned course of action. 
 In the construction of the dialogues for this test, we had to make sure that the argumenta-
tion really amounted to an exaggeration of the consequences but at the other hand the dialogues 
 
2
 F(2,20)=19.92; p<.001; pv=.40 
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should remain natural because otherwise they stand out too much. The following is an example 
of a slippery slope test dialogue: 
 
A: I don’t think that you should throw your chewing gum on the street. 
B: Why not? 
A: Before you know it everybody does it and as a result of that it will not take long before 
people will start to drop their empty cans all around and in no-time everybody will just dump 
their garbage bags in the streets. Eventually the street will become so polluted that it actually is 
unsafe to walk there. 
 
These fallacious uses of the causal relation were contrasted with non-fallacious pragmatic argu-
mentation. We tried to formulate the argumentation in a similar way. That meant that more than 
one consequence of the course of action that was disapproved of were mentioned but these were 
not represented as a causal chain (going from bad to worse): 
  
A: I don’t want you to put a tattoo on your arm. 
B: Why can’t I? 
A: Before you know it, you want the tattoo removed and if you have it removed the skin will 
never be as smooth as it was before. There are a people who really feel sorry about their wrin-
kled skin and they all wish they had never had a tattoo. 
 
The results presented in table 3 suggest that the respondents considered the slippery slope argu-
ments as unreasonable (3.31).  
 
Table 3: Means of reasonableness scores for the slippery slope study (between brackets: stan-
dard deviation; k = number of representations) 
 Mean sd k 
Slippery slope 3.31 (.78) 6 
Pragmatic argumentation 4.97 (.64) 6 
 
Fillers 
Non-pragmatic argumentation 5.31 (.66) 6 
Tu quoque 3.55 (.71) 7 
Direct personal attack 2.62 (.71) 6 
Shifting the burden of proof 2.09 (.79) 6 
(1=very unreasonable, 7=very reasonable) 
 
We found a significant difference between the slippery slope arguments and the reasonable 
pragmatic and non-pragmatic argumentation.
3
 There is no significant difference to be found be-
tween reasonable pragmatic argumentation (4.97) and reasonable non-pragmatic argumentation 
(5.31). The reactions to the filler dialogues were as expected, which is again an indication that 





 F(2,18)=9.62; p<.01; pv=.25 
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The false analogy test 
 
If the argumentation is based on a comparison relation, the analogy must be a sound one. The 
two things compared must really be comparable and there may not be any special circumstances 
that invalidate the comparison. If these requirements are not met, then we have the fallacy of 
false analogy. As there are no formal criteria for judging whether a comparison argumentation is 
sound, this led again to a serious problem. The fallacious discussion moves should clearly con-
tain a false analogy but on the other hand we did not want to run the risk of endangering the in-
ternal validity of the test by including unnatural dialogues. That meant that we had to construct 
comparison argumentations in which the things compared differed clearly on essential points. 
These experimental dialogues were tested in an independent evaluation by three argumentation 
scholars. They all agreed on the fallacious character of the discussion moves. An example of a 
dialogue containing a false analogy is the following: 
 
A: The rules for soccer should be changed in order to make the game more attractive to the 
spectators. 
B: How come? 
A: Commercial companies also change their products to make them more attractive for the 
consumers. 
 
We contrasted the fallacious discussion moves with reasonable comparison argumentation. The 
following is an example of a dialogue containing a non-fallacious comparison argumentation: 
 
A: I think I should get an allowance of three Euros per week. 
B: Why? 
A: When my sister was my age, she received three Euros as well.  
 
Table 4 gives the results of the analogy test. As in all the other tests in this study, the fallacy un-
der investigation was considered unreasonable (3.41).  
 
Table 4: Means of reasonableness scores for the false analogy study (between brackets: stan-
dard deviation; k = number of representations) 
 Mean sd k 
False analogy 3.41 (.70) 13 
Reasonable comparison 5.02 (.67) 5 
Non-comparison (reasonable) 4.74 (.83) 6 
 
Fillers 
Tu quoque 3.83 (.74) 6 
Direct personal attack 2.23 (.65) 6 
Shifting the burden of proof 2.62 (.98) 6 
(1=very unreasonable, 7=very reasonable) 
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The fallacy of false analogy was considered substantially less reasonable than the non-fallacious 
moves.
4
 The difference between the fallacious (3.41) and the non-fallacious comparison argu-
ments (5.02) proved to be significant. There was no difference between reasonable comparison 
argumentation (4.74) and other reasonable argumentation (5.02). The reactions to the fillers were 
all in line with our previous findings. Notice how even in an absolute sense in these four studies 




The results of these four investigations on violations of the pragma-dialectical argument scheme 
rule are homogenous and consistent. Discussion moves that are not violations of discussion rules 
were consistently regarded as reasonable. Fallacious discussion moves were consistently re-
garded as unreasonable. An exception to this general finding was to some extent the tu quoque 
fallacy. In some cases the respondents considered this fallacy as almost reasonable. Whether it 
concerned the freedom rule, the burden of proof rule or the argumentation stage rule, in all cases 
the respondents drew a clear line between fallacious and non-fallacious discussion moves. 
 Taking into account the restrictions of the experimental set up, our findings confirm our 
general expectation that the pragma-dialectical rule for the argument stage is largely in agree-
ment with the norms ordinary arguers claim to apply when judging the reasonableness of discus-
sion moves. This finding provides positive evidence for the conventional validity of the pragma-
dialectical argument scheme rule. Of course, the present research cannot answer the question to 
what extent the current results may be generalized to extra-experimental, real-life situations in 
which people are discussing the acceptability of standpoints, but it certainly shows that the 
pragma-dialectical argument scheme rule is in accord with the norms ordinary arguers apply 
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